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a b s t r a c t
State and local government pension underfunding has become a major focus of public policy debate due 
in large part to recent Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) actions that have brought na­
tional attention to the issue. The extent of these plans underfunding has been debated, along with the 
necessity for state government intervention and the level of regulatory actions that should be enacted 
by state legislatures. State and local public pension plans do not fall under the enumerated powers of 
the federal government in the Constitution and are therefore left to each individual state to regulate. The 
amount of plan underfunding and enacted public policy by state varies greatly. Additionally, in contrast to 
numerous state balanced-budget laws, legal directives for fully funding public pensions are virtually non­
existent. This paper analyzes the state and local public pension crisis, examines current and long-term 
risk, studies public employee fiscal conditions, considers the societal impacts of these plans, considers 
the strengths and weakness of pension plan types, recommends public policy and regulation, and offers 
strategies for managers, board members, and public officials to adopt.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Public pension plans date back to the 1870's when New York 
City police officers were granted lifetime payments at age 55 after 
21 years of service. In comparison, the first private sector plan was 
established in 1875 by the American Express Company. This plan 
created the framework for other pension plans to follow by includ­
ing retirement age, longevity, and percentage of annual salary as 
a basis for providing retirement income. In their case, it was 60 
years of age, with 20 years of continuous service, providing 50% 
of income level at retirement (Stone, 1984). In 1911, Massachusetts 
became the first state to create a pension plan for all general state 
employees (NCPERS, 2003). The growth of public plans continued 
through the 1960's when virtually all public service employees 
were covered by some type of public retirement benefits. These 
payments generally came in the form of defined benefits (DB) that 
guaranteed a fixed income to the retired employee for life. This 
is in contrast to the newer form of pension plans called defined 
contribution (DC) which are 401(k) type plans where employ­
ees and employers contribute to employee-controlled investment 
accounts.
For nearly a century and a half, there has been little concern for 
or discussion regarding the solvency of public DB pension plans 
and payments to retirees have continued to flow. Over the years, 
many of these plans have not been managed properly, and now 
have large future pension liabilities for retirees without the assets 
to cover them. Recently, the GASB has required that any unfunded 
pension liabilities be reported on state and local government bal­
ance sheets and the expected rate of return used in calculating the 
liability.
These new requirements bring significant transformation to de­
termining and reporting pension liabilities. It has been shown that 
bond investors have already adjusted and taken into account the 
unfunded pension liability in both the private sector (Shaw, 2008) 
and in the public sector (Foltin et al., 2017). Therefore, the big­
ger impact of these standards may be the heightened awareness 
GASB has brought to the public regarding underfunding and li­
ability amount. Discount rate, assumptions regarding future re­
turns, amount of benefits, and investment decisions have become 
a matter of public debate. Policy change and media coverage have 
greatly increased since GASB focused attention on the issue espe­
cially with the most troubled pension funds.
Several pension funds across the country experienced much 
publicized troubles with their plans. State plans in California, Illi­
nois, New Jersey, and Kentucky, and municipal plans like Chicago, 
Detroit, and Dallas, have been forced to take action due to low 
funding levels. These events along with GASB’s actions have turned 
a spotlight on the funding of public pensions. Fund management, 
board inaction, elected official indecisiveness, taxpayer funding,
Exhibit 1. Funded Percentage Plan Assets in Proportion to Accrued Pension Liability. 
Source: Pew Charitable Trusts (2018).
expected returns, investment decisions, and benefits to employees 
have all come under scrutiny. Actions to remedy these issues have 
so far largely dealt with benefit cuts by altering the mechanics 
of the plans, such as reducing cost of living adjustments (COLA), 
cutting benefit amounts, increasing retirement age, and even 
moving to DC plans (Foltin et al., 2018). However, the heart of 
the problem - policy, regulation, and governance - has remained 
untouched and virtually unmentioned.
2. Pension plan underfunding
Public pension underfunding amounts vary depending on the 
methodology used in calculating liabilities. Pew Charitable Trusts 
(Craig, 2018) estimates the deficit at $1.4 trillion based upon Com­
prehensive Annual Financial Reports, actuarial reports, and public 
financial statements. In contrast, Stanford University’s Hoover In­
stitution study (Rauh, 2017) places the amount at $3.8 trillion.
The difference in estimates is attributable to the long-range 
projected rate of return. It has been shown that discount rates 
can be manipulated to meet the needs of an entity through lower­
ing the liability on the balance sheet or lowering pension expense 
on the income statement (Fried, Davis-Friday, & Davis, 2014). Pew 
used the actual rates of return applied by the pension funds: a 7.5% 
average rate. The Stanford study uses a weighted average, plan-by- 
plan rate tied to the treasury yield which generates a 2.7% annual 
projected rate of return. The most realistic discount rate and ac­
tual deficit most likely lies somewhere between these two figures 
and will continue to provide debate in state legislatures and on a 
national level.
Private sector research has studied the use of International Ac­
counting Standards in which the long-term expected rate of re­
turn on pension plan assets has been eliminated. However, this 
has shown to have a great impact on firms with “extreme” lev­
els of funded status (Bauman & Shaw, 2016). Using the Pew Data, 
Exhibit 1 lists all the states and their funded percentages.
Under both the Pew and Hoover Institute methodologies, pen­
sion deficits have been rising and funded percentages are decreas­
ing. The 2018 Pew study shows 44 of 50 states experienced a 
decrease in their funded pension percentage, with Wisconsin be­
ing the only state with any improvement at 1%. Although 2017 
numbers are expected to improve, most long-term forecasts pre­
dict continued strain on public pension funds (Foltin et.al, 2018).
3. Pension reforms and fiscal stability
The National Association of State Retirement Administrators 
(NARSA) (Brainard & Brown, 2016) reports that in the last decade, 
every state has passed pension reform legislation, with most leg­
islative changes having a negative impact on the level of em­
ployee benefits awarded. Employees are now required to pay more 
than they have in the past. Forty states lowered benefits by ei­
ther changing formulas used to calculate benefits, reducing COLA, 
and/or requiring employees to work longer. Increased contribu­
tions and cuts in benefits are even more dramatic for newly hired 
employees.
Five states: Michigan, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Vir­
ginia, have created combination DB/DC plans. Kansas and Ken­
tucky created cash balance plans for new employees where the 
employer puts in a percentage of employee salary and provides a 
nominal interest rate. Although cash balance plans are still consid­
ered DB plans, they are a big step closer to DC plans and another 
shift away from traditional DB plans. Arizona and Oklahoma closed 
their traditional DB plans for all new hires with DC being the only 
option. Many of these pension changes have been declared suc­
cessful, have received praise from public officials, and have indeed 
made strides toward reducing governmental pension underfunding. 
The Manhattan Institute (DiSalvo, 2015) and the Brookings Institute 
(McGuinn, 2014) even use some of the above-mentioned states as 
best practice case studies for other governments seeking to reduce 
pension deficits.
Consensus by policymakers does not necessarily demonstrate 
success. Crisis has brought opportunity to make pension benefit 
cuts. Wong (2016) writes that keeping politics out of pension fund 
decisions will benefit fund performance. Whether politics or gen­
uine concern for the financial stability of pension funds is the driv­
ing force behind policy changes, dramatic change is occurring. Af­
ter reviewing pension reforms enacted by states, actions by public 
officials to increase employee contributions, cut benefits, and shift 
toward DC plans are having a positive impact on the stability of 
funds - at the very least, the decline is less.
Exhibit 2. 401(k) Settlements (in millions).
Source: Wilcox Volz and Laermer (2017).
Company Amount Year
Caterpillar $16.5 2009
Hartford/Neuberger Berman $13.9 2009
Bechtel $18.5 2010
General Dynamics $15.1 2010
Walmart/Merrill Lynch $13.5 2011
Kraft $9.5 2012
Cigna $35 2013
International Paper $30 2014
Voya $15 2014
Lockheed Martin $62 2015
Boeing $57 2015
Ameriprise $27.5 2015
MassMutual $30 2016
TIAA $8.9 2017
Although the focus has been on solidifying the financial condi­
tion of public pension funds, it is still early enough in the process 
of public pension restructuring for other factors such as employee 
welfare and societal impact to be taken into account.
4. Shifting risk - Are employees equipped?
Most of the focus surrounding the pension crisis is on the fi­
nancial soundness of the funds and how to fix the underfund­
ing. The employee’s ability to manage money and their long-term 
financial well-being in retirement is often overshadowed by the 
problem garnering the most attention - the underfunding. The em­
phasis has been on the liability, not asset management and em­
ployee security. The fiscal realities that most public sector Ameri­
can workers are faced with has been largely overlooked.
The University of California Berkley Haas Institute study 
(Sgouros, 2017) contends that DC plans are not in the best interest 
of employees or a feasible solution to the looming public employee 
retirement crisis. The study cites higher administrative costs for DC 
plans and the difficulty for an individual to successfully save an ap­
propriate amount in a DC plan to live on for the rest of their life. 
Moreover, the motivation of the private sector toward DC plans is 
marked by bias and the desire to repurpose capital.
Another related problem is putting this risk and responsibility 
of saving and high-level investment decision making on the indi­
vidual employee. Moving investment and mortality risk to employ­
ees without sophisticated financial knowledge creates uncertainty 
and takes away the security of DB plans. Big business or large gov­
ernments have more expertise to make investment decisions, more 
influence in dealing with investment managers, and the financial 
wherewithal to weather a financial crisis.
Merton (2014) predicts a major retirement crisis as baby 
boomers begin to retire. He argues that DC plans wrongly focus 
on fund value and return rather than the income needed upon 
retirement. Merton also asserts it is dangerous and illogical to put 
complex investment decisions in the hands of individuals with lit­
tle financial expertise. This thought is supported by Clark et al. 
(2010) who have shown that older workers are not well informed 
about company and national retirement plans. The lack of finan­
cial literacy of most workers and retirees is certainly a factor that 
must be considered if retirement plans are to provide individuals 
with sufficient financial resources in retirement.
In addition, the financial service firms that manage DC plans 
bring potential vulnerability that could place retirees at risk. For 
example, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Corporation (TIAA), 
the leading retirement investment provider for five million work­
ers and retirees in academic and public service, has recently come 
under scrutiny for the management of its plans. TIAA manages 
a trillion dollars in retirement and other assets. Recent lawsuits 
and whistle-blower complaints by a group of former workers con­
tend that TIAA is pushing customers into investments that do not 
add value, are not in the employees’ best interest, and are pro­
moted to generate higher fees for TIAA rather than for the ben­
efit of members of the plan. Other DC plan managers have also 
been under fire by members. Thus far, there has been over $400 
million awarded by various 401(k) plans to employees and re­
tirees in lawsuits for conflicts of interest over investment decisions 
and oversize fees (Wilcox Volz & Laermer, 2017). Some major lit­
igation awards are shown in Exhibit 2. The lack of profit motive 
in government-managed DB plans mitigates this additional risk 
exposure.
Further adding to the retirement plan problem is the fact 
that most individuals approaching retirement age simply have not 
saved or invested sufficient resources to live on. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO, 2015) found that about half of house­
holds age 55 and older have no retirement savings such as a 401(k) 
plan or IRA. This study found from one-third to two-thirds of 
workers are at risk of falling short of targeted retirement savings.
Participation rates in private retirement plans are heavily based 
upon individual economic situations, or the haves vs. the have- 
nots. For example, high-income professional workers participate at 
a rate that is 44% higher than those individuals working in the ser­
vice area (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016).
Another often unnoticed factor in the debate over public sec­
tor retirement plans is the fact that many public workers are not 
eligible for social security. With no source of federal retirement, 
state and local government workers are even more vulnerable to 
economic pressures in retirement.
5. Societal impact
The impact of depleted public pension plans on society goes be­
yond what some consider a moral obligation to provide a sustain­
able income for individuals who have worked their career in the 
public sector. Drucker (1976) first presented the concept of pension 
fund socialism. At the time, pension funds owned 25% of the eq­
uity capital of American business and had a strong position in the 
nation’s largest companies. Drucker predicted that by 1985, pen­
sion funds would own 50% of the equity capital of American busi­
ness. Drucker characterized this ownership of business by workers 
through pension funds as socialism. However, corporate DB plan 
funds started their decline around this time, with 78% of all em­
ployees participating in a DB pension fund in 1975 as compared 
to 27% participation by 2015 (US Department of Labor, 2018). It 
is clear that the pension fund socialism theory did not come to 
fruition and is evidenced by comparing current private pension 
fund assets of $1.3 trillion, and public pension fund assets of nearly 
$4 trillion versus the overall market capitalization of US domestic 
companies of $27 trillion.
With the decrease in members and money comes a weakening 
of employee influence on corporate America, their boards, and de­
cisions. An individual 401(k) holder loses not only the influence of 
large public plans, but also loses the power to file lawsuits and the 
ability to consult with investment managers. Without pension fund 
representation, shareholder activism of employees is diminished.
Despite the fall of the private sector plans, public pension plans 
can still carry significant weight. The bigger public pension funds 
in the country continue to have an impact among institutional in­
vestors. Despite declining membership across the country, espe­
cially as public-sector unions have come under attack, David Web­
ber (2018), calls public pension funds - organized labor’s most 
potent weapon remaining.
Finally, employees in the U.S. are working longer than they ever 
have. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (Toossi & Tor- 
pey, 2017) reports that workers 55 years of age and over now make 
up 23% of the total workforce, up from 13.1% in 2000. This number 
is expected to rise to nearly 25% by 2020. Public pension reforms 
will help perpetuate this trend, as workers are forced to work 
longer to afford retirement. In addition, there is less opportunity 
for younger workers since older workers are still in their positions. 
This extended work life that America’s society is implementing is 
due in large part to the decrease in DB plans and unpreparedness 
of individuals in DC plans. This is another consideration for public 
pension reform, especially for those serving in public safety.
6. Cost versus benefits of defined benefit plans
As the research cited in the previous two sections demonstrate, 
it can be argued that public sector employees are ill-equipped to 
manage DC plans and DB plans are a value to society. However, 
it can just as easily be claimed that they are an unwarranted fi­
nancial burden on government budgets and an unfair expense to 
citizens. Guaranteed retirement benefits for life can be debated as 
a societal and cultural argument - one of human personal need 
vs. government economic stability. Issues such as retirement age, 
amount of benefit, and cost to taxpayers are all valid considera­
tions which have no right or wrong answer. For most Americans 
who work in the private sector, the debate is all but over. The vast 
majority of people in the U.S. working in corporate America belong 
to DC plans. Now the discussion moves to the government sector 
where the eventual financial drain falls to the taxpayer. Exhibit 3 
details the strengths and weaknesses of DB plans.
The advantages of DB plans primarily center around the benefit 
to the employee, while the disadvantages primarily focus on cost 
to the employer and the fiscal soundness of the government entity 
supported by taxpayer dollars.
As the data in this study reveals, most of the changes have 
trended toward improving the fiscal soundness of the respective 
governments primarily through reduction of benefits. However, an 
example of a less common resolution lies in the City of Chicago, 
where lower employee contributions, cost of living adjustments 
and lower retirement age were maintained in favor of a nearly 30% 
increase in water and sewer rates. This was implemented to fund 
the distressed city workers pension fund. The strong union struc­
ture in Chicago may have played a role in this outcome.
There are some business case arguments that support the con­
cept of DB plans. In the private sector, firms with DB plans had 
increased book value, earnings and market value after pension dis­
closure standards were promulgated (Houmes, Boylan, & Crosby, 
2012). This shows not only improved reporting quality, but pos­
sibly an intangible value to the firm that maintains DB plans.
Another business case claim in support of DB plans lies with 
the ability of state and local governments to be competitive in the 
labor market. A new study shows that recent pension cuts hurt 
governments’ ability to recruit quality workers especially consider­
ing that the private sector typically pays higher wages for similar 
positions (Quinby, Sanzenbacher, & Aubry, 2018).
Alternately, one cannot ignore the cost of public pensions. 
These costs as a percentage of state budgets comprise 4.7% of all 
state and local government spending (NARSA, 2017). When addi­
tional dollars go into pensions, other areas such as parks, educa­
tion, and social programs lose budgetary funding. When consid­
ering addressing the unfunded pension deficit, the impact on the 
budget is even greater. Depending on what discount rate is used, 
the percentage of state and local government budgets that it would 
take to fully fund public pensions could be as much as 20%. The 
fairness of taxpayers carrying this burden should be considered, 
especially since these taxpayers predominantly participate in DC 
plans.
The choices for policymakers are difficult and often influenced 
by the overall financial prosperity of a state and the political struc­
ture as seen in Chicago.
7. Policy authority and influence
Each individual state government holds exclusive control over 
all state and local government pensions. Due to the United States 
Constitution’s Tenth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, (U.S., 1789), 
the federal government can only exercise those rights specifically 
granted in the Constitution: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.” Al­
though the federal government has made some attempts to regu­
late states in areas such as municipal securities through the Secu­
rities and Exchange Commission and by means of self-regulatory 
agencies such as the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, little 
has been done to penetrate the individual states’ control of such 
issues (Foltin, 2017).
With public pension funds exclusively under state and local 
government control, they are not covered under the Employee
Exhibit 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans for Public Employees.
Strength
Employee Security
Weakness
Fiscal cost to the government entity
Earlier retirement age for employees Losing talent earlier, paying pension 
benefits sooner and longer
Makes governments more competitive 
for hiring talented individuals
Obligation to the entity spans for 
decades
Employee investment risk is reduced Risk falls to the government
Provides public employees a voice on 
corporate operations
Employees do not maintain control of 
their investments
Promotes stability and reduces 
turnover
Longer vesting period for the employee 
- pension value often lost until vested
Government entities financially 
stronger and possess better ability to 
manage assets
Fosters financial illiteracy for public 
employees
Less volatility in employee 
contributions and distributions
Restrictions on withdrawal of funds
Less investment and management fees Employee autonomy in choosing 
investments lost
Increased transparency The liability amounts difficult to explain 
and understand
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which sets standards re­
quired by law for all private sector plans. Similarly, if a public­
sector plan runs into severe financial trouble as is happening in 
many states today, there is no payment assurance for retirees 
through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. All regulation 
and standard setting in regard to management, investing, bene­
fits, actuarial estimates, vesting, and funding is the responsibility 
of state lawmakers.
8. State budget policy implications
State regulation ensuring fully funded pension funds is virtually 
non-existent. However, most states have formal balanced budget 
requirements, meaning states must generate sufficient revenue to 
meet operating expenditures in any given year. Any surpluses can 
typically be used to help balance a budget. The National Confer­
ence of State Legislatures NCSL (2010) reports that 49 states (with 
Vermont being the only exception) have balanced budget regula­
tions in their state Constitutions or have enacted laws requiring a 
balanced budget. The National Association of State Budget Officers 
(NASBO, 2015) reports similar findings. These balanced budget laws 
may come in the form of the Governor’s submitted budget, the leg­
islature passed budget, ending carryover deficit, or combinations of 
all three.
Some argue that many balanced budget laws are not 
strong enough. The American Legislative Exchange Council 
(Eucalitto, 2013) cites tactics used to circumvent balanced bud­
get requirements such as shifting of money from different funds, 
shifting payment dates to the following year, using debt, and us­
ing unrealistic expected rates of return on pension payments. Bar­
rett and Green (2011) assert that states often use adjusted fore­
casts and loopholes as additional methods to evade the laws. The 
Institute for Truth in Accounting (2009) has also demonstrated that 
states use accounting to circumvent balanced budget legislation. 
They performed a review of state annual reports that show that 
the majority of states budgets are not balanced. Current financial 
data also supports the argument that states are not truly comply­
ing with balanced budget requirements and there is a large vari­
ance in the fiscal health of the states. A Mercatus Center at George 
Mason University Research study (Norcross and Gonzlaez, 2017) 
ranks the fiscal health of states and shows many states are deal­
ing with serious budgetary problems. The Center extrapolated data 
from the audited financial reports of all 50 states using measures 
of budget solvency, long-run solvency, service-level solvency, and 
trust fund solvency. Exhibit 4 reports their findings. Three states in 
the bottom five: Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey also rank in the 
bottom five for largest deficits in underfunded pension systems.
Despite techniques used to bypass regulations and legislation, 
the principles of balanced budget laws are well founded and 
stronger regulations seem to be helpful. The Urban Institute (2017) 
points to strong anti-deficit laws being associated with reduced 
spending, smaller deficits, more rapid spending adjustments during 
recessions, less debt, lower borrowing costs and higher surpluses. 
In addition, the Mercatus Center (2017) study cites unfunded pen­
sion liabilities as a major problem contributing to state budget dif­
ficulties stating,
“High deficits and debt obligation in the forms of unfunded 
pensions and healthcare benefits continue to drive each state 
into fiscal peril. Each holds tens, if not hundreds, of billions of 
dollars in unfunded liabilities-constituting a significant risk to 
taxpayers in both the short and long-term.”
Based upon budget regulation as a case study, similar pension 
regulatory reform at the state legislative level could be considered 
by each state.
By reviewing the data on regulation surrounding balancing bud­
gets, government regulation on a state-by-state basis could prove 
even more effective in dealing with the pension crisis and prevent­
ing it from getting worse in the future. Whether in support or op­
position to the concept of DB plans, regulation could be helpful in 
dealing with the underfunding problem. States that ensure com­
pliance with budget balancing legislation have much better results 
than those that allow ways around the intent of creating a bal­
anced budget.
9. Strategy for regulatory reform
Although individual regulation and guidance must be adopted 
on a state-by-state basis, generally accepted pension funding guid­
ance can be created on a national level. Advantages and disadvan­
tages of DB plans should be considered when developing new pol­
icy. Even for states moving toward DC plans, the existing obligation 
must be effectively addressed. A collaborative method with the 
major professional organizations involved in recommending public 
pension guidelines would likely be one effective approach.
Exhibit 4. Fiscal Conditions Ranking.
Derived using data from Mercatus Center (Norcross, 2017).
Organizations that should be considered for representation on 
such a committee are the Government Finance Officers Association 
(GFOA), the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers 
and Treasurers (NASACT), the National Governors Association 
(NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), The Na­
tional Association of College and University Business Officers 
(NACUBO), the National Association of State Retirement Adminis­
trators (NARSA), and the American Accounting Association (AAA). A 
role should also be considered for pension research institutes such 
as The Pew Charitable Trusts, the Center for Retirement Research, 
the Hoover Institute, the Urban Institute, and Mercatus Center. This 
joint group should use the following as a foundation for developing 
direction for regulation and guidelines for state managers, boards 
and public officials to adopt in each state:
• Define fully funded and require all funds be funded at that 
amount. The consid­
ers 80% funding of pension liabilities as sufficiently funded be­
cause public employers cannot go out of business like private 
sector counterparts, and state and local governments spread the 
liability over 20 or 30 years. In addition, it is difficult to accu­
rately predict future economic events and numbers of govern­
ment employees participating in any given plan and putting too 
much aside will place too much burden on the funds and tax­
payers. Even with 80% being considered fully funded, 38 states 
currently fall below this fully funded mark. This, or a similarly 
supported rate, should be the amount recommended by the na­
tional board and approved by states as a legal requirement of 
funding.
 Government Accountability Office (2008) 
• A generally accepted variable discount rate should be agreed 
to. A national variable discount rate should be researched and 
subsequently recommended for approval on a state by state 
basis. For example, a variable discount rate at 2.5% above the 
10-year treasury rate based upon current rates would yield a 
5.3% annual expected rate of return. This rate offers a com­
promise between the current average of 7.6% being used and 
the 2.7% recommended rate of the Hoover Institute Study at 
Stanford University (Rauh, 2017). It also better incentivizes pen­
sion fund managers to adopt a less risky approach, allowing 
managers to diversify the portfolio with investments of lower 
volatility. This discount rate could be used as an overall guide­
line but would work better as a regulated percentage. If not 
specifically legally mandated, each fund should implement a 
discount rate based upon a disciplined approach as outlined 
under their investment policy.
• Standards for pension board governance and structure 
should be adopted. In a Sarbanes-Oxley type framework, pen­
sion boards need to take greater responsibility in the gover­
nance of pension plans. Instead of oversight being concentrated 
with plan management, board governance should include a sep­
arate investment committee. Direct reporting, hiring, and com­
pensation of an independent investment advisor to the board is 
an excellent starting point. This investment committee would 
also be responsible for creating and approving the investment 
policy. Actuarial consultants should be considered for direct re­
porting to the board. In addition, discount rate determination 
should be reviewed and formally approved by the board if not 
regulated. Other areas of board management should include in­
dependent external reviews, expertise requirements, conflicts of 
interest checks, and auditor choice.
• Require a Board Passed Investment Policy that includes:
◦ Goals, expectations, objectives, and guidelines;
Exhibit 5. Pension Fund Metrics.
Type Metric Measurement
Solvency Funded Ratio _______Assets_______
Accrued Pension Liability
Solvency Operating Margin Benefit Payments - Employer and 
Employee Contributions
Solvency Operating Cash 
Flow
Benefit Payments - Employer and
____ Employee Contributions
Assets
Risk Volatility Equity and Alternative Investments 
Total Assets
Risk Safety Fixed and Treasury Investments 
Total Assets
Benefit Employee Burden Benefit Payments - Employee Contributions
Benefit Contribution Rate Employee % of Salary paid toward pension
◦ Requirements to perform risk analysis and set risk tolerance 
using tools and analytics such as efficient frontier evaluation 
which charts investments against risks;
◦ Set specific percentage ranges for individual investment cat­
egories such as US Large Cap, US Small Cap, International 
Developed, International Emerging, Diversified, Intermedi­
ate, Global Bonds, Hedge Funds, Alternatives, Short Term 
Treasuries;
◦ Analyze cash flow needs and adopt investment strategies 
based on the timing of cash flows;
◦ Segment investment pools by maturity and types of invest­
ments as follows - short-term (1-2 years), mid-range (3-8 
years), intermediate (9-15 years), long-term (16 plus years);
◦ The mandatory hiring of an investment advisor that is inde­
pendent of investment managers;
◦ Create investment manager criteria;
◦ Set performance objectives;
◦ Develop a transparent, understandable reporting and com­
munication plan; and
◦ Perform an annual review of the investment policy.
• Creation of an independent oversight body should be ex­
plored on a national level. Although difficult to implement na­
tionally due to the states’ rights to regulate their public pension 
plans, a PCAOB-type organization to guide or at least recom­
mend quality controls, ethics, independence, financial reporting 
and auditing rules could be beneficial. Although state and local 
government plans themselves can only be regulated on a state- 
by-state basis; investment advisors, dealers, and brokers can be 
regulated in a similar fashion as the Municipal Securities Rule­
making Board (MRSB). A body of this type can also promote 
transparency, create comprehensive databases of pension infor­
mation, and set standards for investment advisors.
• Generally accepted metric development should occur. Cur­
rently, the only metric that is commonly referred to or used 
as a basis for decision making is the funded rate, which varies 
depending on the discount rate being used. The   Pew Charitable
Trusts (2018) has offered a new measure this year: Operating 
Cash Flow. This metric is created by taking benefit payments 
minus employer and employee contributions and dividing by 
plan assets. It is a benchmark for the rate of return necessary 
to ensure that asset balances do not decline. Other measures for 
solvency, risk, and benefit should be developed. Exhibit 5 pro­
vides a sample of metrics for consideration.
• Fiscal emergency policies should be legislated for pension 
funds. Using several state budgetary laws as a design to build 
from, each state should enact regulation that: (1.) sets criteria 
to identify a funding crisis, (2.) outlines the steps that will be 
taken once an emergency is declared, and (3.) defines the ap­
pointment of a guiding authority while a plan is in crisis. For 
example, 60% to 80% funding of a plan could be deemed fiscal 
watch where the pension plan is given notice to improve. Below 
60% funded could be declared a fiscal emergency. Once a plan is 
declared to be in fiscal emergency, laws, and regulations should 
specify that a state legislative committee, gubernatorial review 
board, or receiver be appointed to address the issue with a re­
quired strategy being adopted within a certain time period less 
than a year.
• Additional actions to consider
◦ Auditors of public pension plans, whether DB or DC, should 
be held to higher levels of accountability and exercise 
greater professional skepticism.
◦ States should review long-range funding of DB plans and 
budget accordingly.
◦ Benefit changes have already occurred in most states and 
some more may be needed, however, this shift from DB to 
DC to solve funding issues should not be the first solution 
of choice as it has been.
◦ An independent professional consulting team to review ar­
eas like management, procedures, and actuarial assumptions 
should be used in public retirement plans. Such an external 
team can also help implement policies not in place outlined 
above.
Exhibit 6. Summary of Recommended Regulatory Pension Reform.
Strategy Area Type of Regulatory Reform
Funding Amount Define fully funded at 80%
Discount Rate Variable rate tied to 10-year Treasury rate
Board Governance Define responsibilities and create an investment 
committee
Investment Policy Require Board passed investment policy including 
guidelines, risk asset classes, and investment advisor
Independent Oversight Create a nationally recognized organization to provide 
guidance and rules
Metrics Define, compute, and benchmark key ratios and 
measures
Intervention triggers Declaration of fiscal emergency for funded levels below 
60%
Additional General Audit, planning, consultation, leadership
◦ Leadership, commitment, and fortitude must be exercised 
by managers, board members, and public officials.
Exhibit 6 summarizes regulatory reform proposals.
10. Conclusion
The recent pronouncements of the GASB have brought to the 
forefront the problems that public pension plans have been expe­
riencing. Although the foundation of public pension plans has al­
ready begun to erode from both a solvency and employee benefits 
perspective, the human impact on the future wellbeing of public 
employees and retirees should be considered along with the so­
cietal impact. State lawmakers should begin consideration of en­
acting and enforcing pension legislation similar to that of existing 
balanced budget laws. National professional organizations should 
band together to present leadership solutions for pension fund 
managers and board members that include recommending a pru­
dent discount rate, defining full funding, adopting a set of met­
rics, guiding pension board governance, and providing direction on 
investment policy. Advantages and disadvantages of DB plans, as 
well as the financial costs versus human impact should be carefully 
contemplated and included in the policy decision process. This pa­
per offers specific recommendations on these matters to build pol­
icy and regulatory solutions upon.
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